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Abstract
Recent studies have shown that most of deaths in the 1918 influenza pandemic were caused by secondary bacterial
infections, primarily pneumococcal pneumonia. Given the availability of antibiotics and pneumococcal vaccination, how will
contemporary populations fare when they are next confronted with pandemic influenza due to a virus with the
transmissibility and virulence of that of 1918? To address this question we use a mathematical model and computer
simulations. Our model considers the epidemiology of both the influenza virus and pneumonia-causing bacteria and allows
for co-infection by these two agents as well as antibiotic treatment, prophylaxis and pneumococcal vaccination. For our
simulations we use influenza transmission and virulence parameters estimated from 1918 pandemic data. We explore the
anticipated rates of secondary pneumococcal pneumonia and death in populations with different prevalence of
pneumococcal carriage and contributions of antibiotic prophylaxis, treatment, and vaccination to these rates. Our analysis
predicts that in countries with lower prevalence of pneumococcal carriage and access to antibiotics and pneumococcal
conjugate vaccines, there would substantially fewer deaths due to pneumonia in contemporary populations confronted
with a 1918-like virus than that observed in the 1918. Our results also predict that if the pneumococcal carriage prevalence
is less than 40%, the positive effects of antibiotic prophylaxis and treatment would be manifest primarily at of level of
individuals. These antibiotic interventions would have little effect on the incidence of pneumonia in the population at large.
We conclude with the recommendation that pandemic preparedness plans should consider co-infection with and the
prevalence of carriage of pneumococci and other bacteria responsible for pneumonia. While antibiotics and vaccines will
certainly reduce the rate of individual mortality, the factor contributing most to the relatively lower anticipated lethality of a
pandemic with a 1918-like influenza virus in contemporary population is the lower prevalence of pneumococcal carriage.
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Introduction
Dominating our fears, driving our surveillance efforts and
preparations for preventing, limiting the spread and treating
influenza is the ‘‘Mother of all pandemics,’’ the1918 flu [1]. Never
in recorded history has the world confronted a single infectious
disease pandemic that lead to as many deaths; estimates ranging
from 20–100 million for the world at large, and on the order of
675,000 in the United States alone [2,3,4]. An estimated 28% of
Americans were symptomatically infected by this virus [2] and,
unlike most influenza pandemics, the rate of mortality was
particularly high in people in their prime of life, those aged 18–
40 years [1].
Can it happen again? Evidence from virus reconstruction and
animal model experiments suggests that the H1N1 influenza virus
responsible for the 1918 flu was more virulent than contemporary
viruses of this type of hemagglutinin and neuraminidase [3,4,5,6].
While we may not be able to say when, there is every reason to
expect that the mutation and recombination events responsible for
the evolution of influenza viruses with the combination of the
virulence, and human to human transmissibility of the 1918 flu
can and doubtless will be repeated.
Given what we know now about the 1918 influenza pandemic
and the medical and public health technology currently available,
in contemporary human populations what would be the incidence
of symptomatic infections and the mortality rate of a pandemic
with an influenza virus of the virulence and transmissibility of that
of 1918? What would be the optimum procedure to deal with this
potential pandemic?
To address these questions, we use a mathematical model and
computer simulations. Central to our model and analysis is the
evidence that most of the pneumonias and deaths of the 1918
influenza pandemic can be attributed to a kind of conspiracy
between the influenza virus and bacteria, primarily secondary
infections with Streptococcus pneumoniae [7,8,9]. As evidence now
indicates [10,11], in our co-infection model individuals infected
both with the influenza virus and the bacteria have higher rates of
mortality than those infected with the virus or bacteria alone. We
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account for dynamics and mortality rates observed in 1918, using
virus transmission, pneumococcal carriage and virulence param-
eters estimated from the most realiable1918 data we can find. We
then consider the incidence and mortality rates of secondary
pneumococcal pneumonia that would be anticipated for a
pandemic with a virus of the 1918 ilk with the pneumococcal
carriage prevalence of contemporary populations in developed
and developing countries, and with antibiotics for prophylaxis and
treatment of secondary bacterial pneumonia. We further consider
the impact of pneumococcal conjugate vaccination of infants,
which has been shown to reduce hospitalization due to influenza
[12,13]. We discuss the implications of these computer simulation
results to planning for the next influenza pandemic.
Methods
Model development
Our complete ‘‘compartment’’ model [14] including co-
infection with the influenza virus and bacteria; and antibiotic
prophylaxis and treatment of the bacterial infection is obviously
complex. To facilitate its presentation, we separately consider its
different components and how they are modeled.
i) Single infection with the pandemic influenza
virus. Considering a single homogenous population with no
immunity to a novel pandemic strain, we assume that hosts are of
four states with respect to the influenza infection, susceptible (X),
asymptomatically infected (YFA), symptomatically infected (YFS)
and recovered (ZF) (Figure 1A). The variables, X, YFA,Y F S,Z F
and those in the models to follow are both the densities of hosts of
each of these states as well as their designations. The population
size (N) is the sum of densities of all compartments. These and the
other variables of this model and the models to follow as well as
their parameters are separately defined in Table 1 and Table 2.
Both the YFA and YFS hosts are infectious, with transmission
rate constants, bFA and bFS and a fraction, sF (0#sF#1) of newly
infected hosts are symptomatic. Transmission occurs at rates
proportional to product of X and lF, where lF is the sum of the
products of the proportions of infected hosts and the correspond-
ing transmission rate constants (lF~bFAYFA=NzbFSYFS=N).
YFA and YFS hosts enter the recovered state (ZF) at rates nFA and
nFS per host per day. In this, like most compartment models,
virulence is reflected in the mortality rate. We assume symptom-
atically infected hosts (YFS) have a death rate directly due to
primary influenza infection dF per host per day. The duration of
the infections and thereby the amount of time available for
transmission are the reciprocals of these rates, for example,
symptomatic host, YFS, remains infected for 1=(nFSzdF) days.
The birth rate and influenza-independent death rate are neglected
in our model.
ii) Single infection with bacteria. Given the variety of
pneumococcal serotypes and other bacterial pathogens, we assume
that there is no immunity to bacterial colonization. As a result, our
model for bacterial transmission only contains two compartments:
Figure 1. Model structure. (A) Compartment model for single infection with pandemic influenza virus. (B) Compartment model for single infection
with bacteria. (C) Compartment model for virus – bacterial co-infection in influenza pandemics. See Table 1 and Table 2 for definition of the variables
and parameters, and see the text for more details about the model description.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029219.g001
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infectious with a transmission rate constant bB and are
spontaneously cleared at a rate of nB per host per day. In this
model, we neglect the mortality due to the bacterial infection
alone.
(iii) Virus – bacterial co-infection. For co-infection we
separately consider hosts that are infected by both bacteria and
virus and the order at which they are infected, bacteria first or
virus first, YBFA, YBFS,Y F AB and YFSB, respectively (Figure 1C).
For example YBFA represents hosts that are first colonized with
bacteria and then asymptomatically infected with influenza virus.
In this way we can allow for different rates of transmission and
rates of recovery of the different jointly infected hosts. The purpose
of making this distinction rather than considering only one class of
joint infection is to account for the observations made with animal
experiments. The likelihood of mortality is different in hosts first
infected with the influenza virus than those first infected with the
bacteria responsible for the pneumonia [10,11].
A YBFA or YBFS host can be produced by a YB host
encountering one of the influenza infected hosts, YFA,Y F S, YBFA,
YBFS,Y F AB, and YFSB. Similarly, a YFABo rY F SB host can be
produced by a YFA or a YFS host being infected by a host carrying
bacteria, YB, YBFA, YBFS,Y F AB, YFSB, YP or ZFYB. We
assume that influenza – infected hosts, YFA and YFS, are more
likely to acquire bacterial colonization than influenza – free hosts
when they encounter bacteria [15,16,17]. Therefore, a YFA or
YFS host can be infected with bacteria at rate of dFA6lB or
dFS6lB, correspondingly, where dFS and dFA are constants $1
and lB is the sum of the products of the proportions of colonized
hosts and the corresponding transmission rate constants (see
Appendix S1 for the equations). We also assume that co-infected
hosts can transmit bacteria more efficiently than influenza – free
hosts [18,19,20,21]. For example, co-infected hosts with symp-
tomatic influenza (YBFS and YFSB) can transmit bacteria with a
transmission rate constant sFS6bB (sFS$1). Similarly, YBFA and
YFAB hosts have a transmission rate constant sFA6bB (sFA$1) for
bacteria. On the other hand, we assume that the co-infected hosts
have the same transmission rate constant for influenza virus, bFA
or bFS,a sY F A or YFS hosts, depending on whether their influenza
infections are symptomatic or not.
The four different co-infected host populations YBFA, YBFS,
YFAB and YFSB, leave their states at rates nBFA, nBFS, nFAB, and
nFSB per host per day, respectively. Fractions of these co-infected
hosts, respectively aBFA, aBFS, aFAB, and aFSB (0#as#1) develop
secondary bacterial pneumonia (YP) and the remainder enter state
designate ZFYB. In this state individuals have recovered from
influenza, but are still colonized with bacteria because we are
assuming the duration of infection and infectiousness for the
influenza virus is much shorter than for the bacteria [22,23]. We
also assume that jointly infected hosts, YBFS and YFSB have an
additional death rate from primary influenza infection (dF)a sd o
the host symptomatically infected solely with the influenza virus,
YFS. Hosts with secondary bacterial pneumonia (YP) leave their
compartment at rate nP per host per day. The case fatality of
secondary bacterial pneumonia is cP (0#cP#1 ) and those who
survive enter the ZFYB state. Hosts who recover from influenza
infection (ZF and ZFYB) are assumed to have long-term immunity
to infection with this virus, do not return to the naı ¨ve uninfected
host state X. On the other hand, we assume that immunity to
influenza does not make these recovered ZF hosts any more
refractory to bacterial colonization than X hosts.
iv) Co-infection model with antibiotic treatment and
prophylaxis. Antibiotics would be used in two ways. One is to
treat patients with secondary bacterial pneumonia. We assume that
a fraction (fT) of patients with secondary pneumonia, YP, will be
treatedwithantibiotics. The treated people havea lower probability
of death (case fatality), cPT and their bacterial colonization is
eliminated after treatment. The other way antibiotics would be used
is for prophylaxis of hosts with symptomatic influenza to prevent
secondary bacterial pneumonia. We assume that prophylaxis is
empiric without distinction about whether the prophylaxed host has
bacterial colonization or not. Thus, a fraction, fP (0#fP#1) of YFS
and YBFS are prophylaxed with antibiotics. We assume that
prophylaxed YFS hosts have a lower probability of acquiring
bacterial colonization once they encounter hosts carrying bacteria
than unprophylaxed YFS hosts. This efficacy of reducing
susceptibility to colonization is represented by r (0#r#1).
Therefore, YFS hosts enter YFSB at a rate (1{fP)dFSlB
zfP(1{r)dFSlB. For the prophylaxed YBFS hosts, we assume
that the efficacy of prophylaxis to clear the bacterial colonization is
c, and those who clear their bacterial colonization would move to
the ZF state. In the remaining (1 - c), the prophylaxed hosts are still
colonized with bacteria and we assume these individuals have the
same risk of developing secondary pneumonia as unprophylaxed
Table 1. Variables in the influenza virus – bacterial co-infection model.
Variables Definition
X Number of people susceptible to both influenza virus and bacteria
YFA Number of people with asymptomatic influenza infection but not colonized with bacteria
YFS Number of people with symptomatic influenza infections but not colonized with bacteria
ZF Number of people have recovered from influenza infection
YB Number of people colonized with bacteria and susceptible to influenza virus
YBFA Number of co-infected people who are colonized with bacteria first then acquire asymptomatic influenza infection
YBFS Number of co-infected people who are colonized with bacteria first then acquire symptomatic influenza infection
YFAB Number of co-infected people who are asymptomatically infected with influenza first and then acquire bacterial colonization
YFSB Number of co-infected people who are symptomatically infected with influenza first and then acquire bacterial colonization
YP Number of people who develop secondary bacterial pneumonia
ZFYB Number of people who have recovered from influenza infection but are still colonized with bacteria.
N Total number of population
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029219.t001
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develop secondary bacterial pneumonia with a probability of aFBS
or move to the ZFYB state. We assume that the prophylaxed hosts
have the same additional death rate from primary influenza
infection (dF)a sY F S hosts. In Figure 2, we illustrate how antibiotic
prophylaxis is modeled for YBFS hosts.
As in other compartment models, the change in the density of each
host state is represented by a differential equation.In Appendix S1,we
present the complete set of differential equations for this co-infection,
treatment and prophylaxis model. For the numerical solutions
employed to explore its properties we use Berkeley Madonna
TM 8.3
copies of this program are available on www.eclf.net.
Parameterization
Although our model is general and appropriate for most
bacteria responsible for respiratory infections, for our numerical
analysis of bacterial elements of the properties of this model we use
parameters estimated for Streptococcus pneumoniae because pneumo-
cocci appear to be single most significant bacteria responsible for
secondary infections in 1918, and the necessary epidemiological
data seem to be most available for the pneumococci. The values or
ranges of values of the parameters used in our models, as well as
the sources of justification for these estimates are listed in Table 2.
The parameter dF per host per day is the death rate (virulence)
of the 1918 virus for symptomatic infected hosts in the absence of
Table 2. Parameters in the influenza – bacteria co-infection model.
Symbol Meaning Base case Assumptions/References
RE Effective reproductive number for pandemic influenza virus 1.8 Basedon Refs. [37,38,39] Canbe reduced with antiviral interventions
sF Proportion of newly influenza-infected hosts who
have typical influenza symptoms
40% Although 66.9% of influenza infection results in some symptoms
[22], we decided to use 40% to get an influenza attack rate similar
to those observed in 1918 [2]. Additionally, this number is close to
fraction of infected people with typical influenza symptoms (like
fever) [22] who are more likely to be prophylaxed.
nFS, nFB Recovery rate per host per day for YFA and YFB hosts 1/4.8 Based on Ref. [22]. Assume nFS=nFB
bFA
bFS
Transmission rate constant for hosts with asymptomatic
and symptomatic influenza infection.
4.96
7.92
Calculated from RE, nFS,, and sF. Assume asymptomatic hosts are
half infectious as symptomatic hosts (bFA=0.5*bFS).
dF Death rate per host per day directly due to influenza virus
among hosts with symptomatic influenza infection
0.00026 Virulence parameter estimated by calibration
pB Prevalence of bacterial colonization before the pandemic 40% The prevalence of pneumococcal colonization was 40% in 1918
[26,27,28]. Varied for different scenarios today
bB, Transmission rate constant for bacteria nB/(12pB) Assume bacterial transmission before the pandemic is at
equilibrium, thus bB=nB/(12pB). Varied based on pB.
nB Recovery rate per host per day for bacterial colonization 1/37 Based on Ref. [23].
dFA The increase of bacterial acquisition for hosts with
asymptomatic influenza infection
1 Assume asymptomatic influenza infection does not increase the
susceptibility to bacterial colonization
dFS The increase of bacterial acquisition for hosts with
symptomatic influenza infection
4 Basedonan animalstudyshowingthatinfluenzainfection increased
the susceptibility of ferrets to pneumococcal acquisition [46].
sFA The increase of transmission of bacteria for hosts with
asymptomatic influenza infection
1 Assume asymptomatic influenza infection does not increase
bacterial transmission
sFS The increase of transmission of bacteria for hosts with
symptomatic influenza infection
3.5 Based on a human study testing the dispersal Staphylococcus
aureus after experimentally infected with rhinovirus [20].
nBFS, nBFA, nFSB,
nFAB
Recovery rate per host per day for YBFS, YBFA,Y F SB
and YFAB, respectively
4.8d Assume equal to nFS and nFB because the duration of influenza
infection is much shorter than the duration of bacterial
colonization.
aBFA, aFAB Risk of secondary bacterial for YBFA and YFAB 0 Assume people with asymptomatic influenza infections do not
develop secondary bacterial pneumonia.
aBFS
aFSB
Risk of secondary bacterial for YBFS and YFSB. 3.6%
14.4%
Virulence parameters estimated by calibration. Assume
aFBS=4aBFS in the base case but also consider two extreme
conditions: (i)aFSB=aBFS; (ii)aFSB.aBFS=0. These numbers are
reduced by 45% in countries with PCV program for children.
nP Recovery rate per host per day for secondary bacterial
pneumonia
10d Based on Ref. [43].
cP Case fatality rate of secondary bacterial pneumonia 30% Based on Ref. [2].
fT Fraction of symptomatic flu patients treated with antibiotics 0–100% Varied for different scenarios
cPT Case fatality rate of secondary pneumococcal pneumonia for
patients treated with antibiotics
10% Based on Ref. [49,61].
fP Fraction of symptomatic flu patients prophylaxed
with antibiotics
0–100% Varied for different scenarios
R The efficacy of antibiotic prophylaxis in reducing bacterial
acquisition
78% Based on based on a clinical trial testing the effect of short-course,
high-dose oral amoxicillin therapy on pneumococcal carriage [40].
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co-infected hosts to develop secondary bacterial pneumonia are,
aBFA, aFAB, aBFS, and aFSB for the YBFA,Y F AB, YBFS,a n dY F SB
host, respectively. We assume that asymptomatic influenza
infections do not lead to bacterial pneumonia (aBFA=aFAB=0).
For symptomatic influenza infections, we allow for the possibility
that influenza infection preceding pneumococcal colonization
results in a higher risk bacterial pneumonia than bacterial
colonization preceding influenza infection as the base case (aFSB=4
aBFS) [10,11]. To explore the sensitivity of the dynamics to this
assumption, we also consider situations where aFSB=aBFS and
where aFSB.aBFS=0. The values of the virulence - specific
parameters for the 1918 virus (dF, aBFS,a n daFSB,) are calculated
by determining the parameter conditions under which the co-
infection model best accounts for the excess all-cause mortality in
the New York City during the fall and winter wave of the1918
pandemic (5.3 per 1000) [24,25]. For this we assume that 7% of this
excess mortality was caused directly by virus, with the remaining
93% due to bacterial pneumonia [7] and that pneumococcus was
responsible for 71% of the bacterial pneumonias [9].
Given the major role played by the pneumococcus in
pneumonia mortality during the 1918 pandemic, the likelihood
of an infection with a virulent pneumococcus immediately after
influenza becomes a critical risk for pneumonia. In 1918, it would
seem that the likelihood of acquiring a new pneumococcus whilst
suffering from influenza was greater than it is at present. The
prevalence of pneumococcal carriage in adults in 1918 was ,40%
[26,27,28], whilst in contemporary populations in developed
countries this carriage rate is less than 10% or even less than 5%
[29,30,31,32]. It should be noted, however, that pneumococcal
prevalence in adults is still very high in some developing countries,
such as The Gambia where a 40% carriage has been reported
[33]. Another difference between 1918 and today is the current
widespread use of the pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) in
children in developed countries, which has reduced the incidence
of invasive pneumococcal disease and non-bacteremic pneumonia
in all age group by approximately 45% [12,34,35]. In its current
form our model does not specifically account for the dynamics of a
PCV (or influenza) vaccination program. We can, however
consider the consequences of vaccination for PCV in one of two
ways, by its affect on the rate of transmission, or by its effect on the
incidence of secondary bacterial pneumonia by people manifesting
the symptoms of influenza. Because of the dearth of data on the
serotypes of S. pneumoniae responsible for the pneumonias in the
1918 pandemic, to account for the wide spread use of the PCV we
assume vaccine reduces the 1918 estimates of aFSB and aBFS by
45% [12,34,35]. The transmission rate constant of pneumococcus
is not changed because its value depends on the equilibrium
pneumococcal prevalence, which has not changed since the
introduction of PCV, presumably because of serotype replacement
in the nasopharynx [36] (Table 2).
An overview of the analysis
After using our model to estimate values of the three virulence
parameters of the 1918 influenza virus, we predict the incidence of
pneumococcal pneumonia (IPP) under different scenarios about
the prevalence of pneumococcal colonization at the start of a
pandemic with an 1918-like influenza virus and different
assumptions about the order of infection. We then investigate
the extent to which antibiotic treatment for patients with
secondary pneumonia can reduce the incidence and mortality of
pneumococcal pneumonia. Finally, we consider the effect of
antibiotic prophylaxis for patients with symptomatic influenza on
reducing IPP and the pneumococcal prevalence. In this last
analysis we explore the number of symptomatic influenza patients
needed to be prophylaxed with antibiotics to prevent one case of
pneumococcal pneumonia as the Number Needed to be
Prophylaxed (NNP).
NNP~ 1
(ARPneumoniajFlu, no prophylaxis{ ARPneumoniajFlu,100%prophylaxis)
Where ARPneumonia|Flu, no prophylaxis and ARPneumonia|Flu, 100%
prophylaxis are the attack rates of secondary pneumococcal
pneumonia among patients with symptomatic influenza given no
prophylaxis and 100% prophylaxis, respectively.
We calculate NNP for different prevalences of pneumococcal
colonization in populations with and without PCV programs. We
also consider a range of values of the effective reproductive
number of influenza (RE) [23], because the transmission of
influenza virus could be mitigated by other interventions, such as
antiviral prophylaxis or influenza vaccines. In our analysis, we are
primarily interested in the incidence of pneumococcal pneumonia
rather than just the mortality rate. The reason is that the mortality
rate reflects factors not considered in the model, like the quality of
care or age of the patient. The incidence is also important as it
reflects the number of people who need medication and
Figure 2. Diagram for how antibiotic prophylaxis is modeled for YBFS hosts. See the text and associated tables for more details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029219.g002
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start of the pandemic, a single YFs host is introduced into
populations of 1,000,000 people who are wholly susceptible to
influenza and different prevalences of pneumococcal carriage. We
explore the sensitivity of the predicted NNPs by varying the central
parameters by 610% and generating a tornado plot.
Results
Predicting and learning (estimating parameters) from the
past
We open our analysis of the properties of this model by
exploring its ability to account for observations made in the 1918
pandemic, based on independent estimates of its parameters.
The 1918 influenza attack rate. At equilibrium, the fraction
of population infected with influenza depends solely on the
effective reproductive number RE (roughly the number of
secondary infections caused by a single infectious individual
entering that population). When RE=1.8, the estimated value
[37,38,39], in accord with our model 73% of the population would
be infected with the virus. If we assume that 40% of these infected
people (sF) have typical influenza symptoms (see Table 2), the
influenza attack rate would be 29%, which is close to that observed
in the 1918 pandemic in the United States [2].
The virulence parameters. Assuming the excess mortality
rate data for the 1918 pandemic in New York City, the above
estimates of the influenza attack rate, and the other parameters in
range of those in Table 2, using our co-infection model we
determine the best fitting values of the three virulence parameters.
We estimate the death rate due to the influenza virus alone, dF,t o
be 0.00026 per day. The magnitudes of probabilities of developing
secondary pneumonia by coinfected people, aFSB and aBFS,
depend on the order of the infections. If we assume a prior
symptomatic influenza infection increases the probability of
pneumococcal pneumonia (aFSB=4 aBFS), aFSB and aBFS are
respectively 14.4% and 3.6%. If the order of co-infection does not
matter (aFSB=aBFS), the risk of secondary pneumonia for the co-
infected hosts is 6.7%. In another extreme case, co-infected hosts
who are first colonized with bacteria do not develop secondary
pneumonia (aBFS=0), the probability of developing secondary
pneumonia for influenza first infection YFSB hosts (aFSB) is 23.0%.
Anticipating the Future
The effects of pneumococcal carriage prevalence. Using
baseline values of the parameters shown in Table 2, we estimate
the incidence of pneumococcal pneumonia (IPP) for a future
pandemic due to a 1918-like virus under different assumptions
Figure 3. Modeling results. (A) The predicted incidence of pneumococcal pneumonia in a 1918-like influenza pandemic under different initial
prevalence of pneumococcal colonization and three assumptions regarding the relationship between aFSB and aBFS. (B) The predicted mortality and
incidence of pneumococcal pneumonia in a 1918-like pandemic when 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of pneumonia patients were treated with
antibiotics and the initial pneumococcal carriage was 40%. (C) The predicted incidence of pneumococcal pneumonia in a 1918-like pandemic when
0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of patients with symptomatic influenza infection received antibiotic prophylaxis under different initial pneumococcal
prevalence. (D) The predicted prevalence of pneumococcal colonization during the progress of a 1918-like influenza pandemic when 0%, 25%, 50%,
75% and 100% of patients with symptomatic influenza infection received antibiotic prophylaxis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029219.g003
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virulence of different orders of co-infection. The results of our
analysis are presented in Figure 3A. If there is no order effect,
aFSB=aBFS, IPP increases monotonically with the pneumococcal
prevalence. If there is an order effect, the IPP increases when the
prevalence of pneumococcal carriage is low but declines when the
prevalence of carriage is high. The reason for this is that fewer
people acquire new pneumococcal colonization during the
pandemic. However, with respect to the IPP, these three
assumptions yield very similar estimates when the prevalence of
carriage is within the realistic range (#40%). Based on this
prediction, we restrict the following analysis to a single situation
(aFSB=4 aBFS). When the initial prevalences of carriage are 5%,
10%, 20% and 40% the predicted IPPs are, respectively 1.96, 3.78,
7.00 and 11.74 per 1000 population. The mortality caused by
primary viral infection does not vary with different pneumococcal
prevalence and is approximately 0.37 per 1000 population.
Antibiotic treatment. We assume that antibiotic treatment
reduces the case mortality rate of pneumococcal pneumonia from
30% to 10% (see Table 2). In Figure 3B we plot the anticipated
incidence and mortality due to pneumococcal pneumonia for a
1918-like influenza pandemic as a function of the fraction of the
treated patients with secondary pneumonia assuming 40% carriage.
These results suggest that although widespread antibiotic treatment
for pneumonia would significantly reduce mortality, it would have
little effect on the IPP. The reason for this is that people with active
pneumonia represent a small fraction of the individuals colonized
with these bacteria and thereby responsible for their transmission.
Thus,althoughtreatmenteliminatescolonizationaswellasincreases
survival, its effect at the population level is anticipated to be small.
Antibiotic prophylaxis. In Figure 3C we consider the
anticipated effects of antibiotic prophylaxis on the IPP for different
fractions of symptomatic influenza patients receiving these drugs
prior to the onset of pneumonia. We make this calculation for
different initial prevalences of pneumococcal carriage. In this
analysis we are assuming that the efficacy of antibiotic prophylaxis
forreducingthesusceptibilitytobacterialcolonizationandclearance
given colonization are respectively 78% and 72% [40]. As would be
anticipated intuitively, antibiotic prophylaxis can substantially
reduce the IPP. For example, with these parameters, 40% carriage
and 75% of people with symptomatic influenza prophylaxed, the
IPP would be reduced by more than 50%, relative to that
anticipated in the absence of prophylaxis.
To illustrate the consequencesofthis intervention, we considerthe
predicted IPP and the NNP (number needed to be prophylaxed) to
prevent one case of pneumococcal pneumonia. We consider this for
countries with and without PCV programs and for different effective
reproductive number (RE), see Table 3 and Table 4. When the RE is
1.8, the estimated NNP to prevent one case of pneumococcal
pneumonia in countries without PCV program are 188.6, 98.8, 54.4
and 33.9 when the initial prevalences of pneumococcal carriage are
respectively, 5%, 10%, 20% and 40%. The IPP is anticipated to be
reduced by approximately 45% and the NNP increased by
approximately 81% in countries with a PCV program relative to
those without. The RE has marked effect on the estimated IPP, but
the NNP is only slighted affected by the RE. In coutries with a
pneumococcalprevalence of40%,no PCV programandno antiviral
interventions to reduceRE, the pandemic would not be very different
from that of 1918 pandemic: the estimated IIP is 11.74 per 1000 and
the NNP 33.9. On the other hand, in countries with only 5%
pneumococcal prevalence and a PCV program, the estimated IPP is
1.08 per 1000 and NNP is 343 when the RE is 1.8.IfRE is reduced to
1.2, e.g. by antiviral prophylaxis or influenza vaccines, the esimtated
IPP would be reduced to 0.40 per 1000 and the NNP 403.6.
In Figure 3D, we follow the temporal changes in the prevalence
of pneumococcal colonization during the course of the pandemic
with different fractions of the population prophylaxed and an
initial pneumococcal carriage prevalence of 40%. In the absence
of antibiotic prophylaxis, pneumococcal prevalence gradually
increases to 48.5% during the pandemic and then returns to the
equilibrium level after the pandemic. Antibiotic prophylaxis would
reduce bacterial transmission and thereby the level of pneumo-
coccal carriage during the pandemic.
Sensitivity analysis
To deal with the uncertainty of parameter values, we use a
tornado plot to explore the sensitivity of our predicted NNP by
varying the dominant parameters by 610% for a situation
where the prevalence of bacterial colonization is 10% (Figure 4).
The estimated NNP is most sensitive to the risks of secondary
pneumonia among the co-infected people (aFSB and aBFS).
Other influential parameters included the recovery rate for
pneumococcal colonization (nB), the recovery rate for influenza
(nFS and nFA), the effect of influenza infection on bacterial
colonization and transmission (dFS and sFS), the efficacies of
antibiotic prophylaxis on bacterial transmission and coloniza-
tion (r and c).
Discussion
‘‘It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.’’
(Attributed to Yogi Berra but also Neils Bohr)
Table 3. The estimated incidence of pneumococcal
pneumonia (IPP) per 1000 in countries with and without a
PCV program under different pneumococcal prevalence and
effective reproductive number (RE).
RE=1.8 RE=1.5 RE=1.2
Pneumococcal
carriage No PCV PCV No PCV PCV No PCV PCV
5% 1.96 1.08 1.47 0.81 0.73 0.40
10% 3.78 2.08 2.85 1.57 1.42 0.78
20% 7.00 3.85 5.31 2.92 2.68 1.47
40% 11.74 6.45 9.05 4.98 4.68 2.57
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029219.t003
Table 4. The estimated number needed to be prophylaxed to
prevent one case of pneumococcal pneumonia (NNP) in
countries with and without a PCV program under different




carriage No PCV PCV No PCV PCV No PCV PCV
5% 188.6 343.0 201.6 366.5 222.0 403.6
10% 98.8 179.6 105.1 191.1 115.1 209.3
20% 54.4 99.0 57.4 104.4 62.1 112.9
40% 33.9 61.7 35.2 63.9 36.9 67.1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029219.t004
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virus with a transmission rate, virulence and virulence mechanism
similar to that of the 1918 H1N1 virus, would we better off now
than we were then? We interpret the results of this theoretical
study as support for a positive answer to this question.
Central to our model and this interpretation is the evidence that
most of the morbidity and mortality of the 1918 pandemic can be
attributed to secondary bacterial infections, primarily pneumonia
due S. pneumoniae (the pneumococcus). The evidence and
arguments in support of this assertion have been presented
elsewhere and won’t be reviewed here [7,8,9,41,42,43,44,45]. Also
central to our model and interpretation is the premise that
respiratory viral infections increase the likelihood of colonization
by pneumococci [15,16,17,46] and the rate of transmission of
bacteria [18,19,20,21,46]. Finally we assume that in the course of
an influenza pandemic with the transmissibility and virulence of
that of 1918, virtually all cases of pneumococcal pneumonia occur
in co-infected people.
There are two primary reasons for anticipating substantially
lower rates of the bacterial pneumonia responsible for most of the
morbidity and mortality of the 1918 influenza pandemic,
especially in current developed countries. First, in developed and
many underdeveloped countries the prevalence of pneumococcal
carriage in adults is substantially lower than it was in 1918
[26,27,28,29,30,31,32]. As a result there would be both lower rates
of pneumonia and the infectious transmission of these bacteria.
Second is the widespread use of pneumococcal conjugate vaccines
(PCV). This vaccine appears to contribute little to the decline in
overall prevalence of carriage of these bacteria, due to the
replacement of the vaccine serotypes by others [36]. On the other
hand, there is good evidence that PCV reduces the likelihood of
pneumococcal pneumonia in not only vaccinated individuals but
also in the population at large, which is the way we incorporated
its widespread use in our analysis. Although some of this
population-wide reduction in pneumococcal pneumonia is due
to herd immunity [34,35], this transmission component of a
vaccination program is not formally considered in our model. It is,
however, implicit in our assumption that the vaccine reduces the
incidence of pneumococcal pneumonia by 45%.
In many cases, interventions for infectious diseases that are good
for individuals may have little positive and sometimes even may
even negative consequences for the collective. The results of our
analysis suggest this is going to be the case for antibiotic
prophylaxis during a 1918-like influenza pandemic. Because of
the relatively small risk of secondary bacterial infections in
populations with low and modest prevalence of pneumococcus
carriage, antibiotic prophylaxis for all symptomatic influenza
patients would have little effect in reducing the incidence of
pneumonia in the collective. In accord with our analysis, hundreds
of patients with symptomatic influenza would need to be
prophylaxed, NNP, to prevent a single case of secondary
pneumococcal pneumonia, even in this model which assumes that
asymptomatic influenza infection does not increase the suscepti-
bility to bacterial colonization or transmission. If asymptomatic
infection can in fact increase bacterial colonization or transmis-
sion, antibiotic prophylaxis will be even less effective than
predicted by our model because antibiotic prophylaxis in this
model targets only symptomatic patients. Our model further does
not consider the potentially deleterious impact that mass antibiotic
prophylaxis may have on antibiotic resistance. When considering
this NNP and contribution of antibiotic use to the ascent of
resistance, at the level of the collective, antibiotic prophylaxis for
all symptomatic influenza infections would be difficult to justify.
This is particularly so when antibiotic treatment for the bacterial
pneumonias that do arise in this small minority is a viable
alternative to prophylaxis for many.
In this regard, a very different conclusion may be in order for
underdeveloped countries where the prevalence of pneumococcal
carriage is substantial [33]. Because of the latter, the estimated
NNP to prevent a single case of secondary pneumonia would be
on the order of 30–35. Unfortunately, associated with high
frequencies of pneumococcal carriage in these countries is a dearth
of the money needed for the wide spread purchase of prophylactic
antibiotics. No matter where, the cost effectiveness of antibiotic
prophylaxis would greatly augmented if there were procedures to
identify people who are at particular risk of these secondary
infections or members of clear risk groups, like people with other
co-morbidities. During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic patients aged 6–
65 years who carried the pneumococcus in the nasopharynx were
at much higher risk of severe pneumonia or death compared to
patients without pneumococcal carriage (adjusted odd ratio 126)
[47].
Antibiotic treatment of secondary bacterial infections would also
be more advantageous to individuals than populations. In accord
with our analysis, the treatment of patients with pneumococcal
pneumonia would have a negligible affect on the transmission and
thereby the frequency of carriage and infection by these bacteria.
Unlike prophylaxis, however, the individual benefit of the use of
antibiotics for treatment can be considerable and will almost
certainly outweigh the cost associated with the promotion of
resistance. Indeed, if we consider the mortality of bacteriemic
pneumococcal pneumonia before and after the introduction of
penicillin, 80% down to 10–15%, [48,49], which is where it is now
[50], antibiotic treatment is of considerable advantage to
individuals with this disease.
If, as suggested by the animal model experiments [10,11], the
likelihood of pneumonia in humans is greater when the bacteria
follow the virus infection than the reverse, the order of the
infection would play an important role in the course of the disease
for individuals. Our results suggest, however that this order effect
may contribute little to the incidence of bacterial pneumonia for
the population at large. As long as the prevalence of carriage is
modest, less than 40%, the incidence of pneumococcal pneumo-
nia, IPP, is relatively independent of the order of infection (see
Figure 3A). On the other hand, when the prevalence of
Figure 4. Sensitivity analysis. Tornado plot of number needed to be
prophylaxed (NNP) to prevent one case of pneumococcal pneumonia
with 610% changes in parameters when the initial pneumococcal
prevalence is 10%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029219.g004
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becomes increasingly important at the population as well as the
individual level. In fact, as the prevalence increases bacterial
colonization can be protective if the likelihood of pneumonia is
greater when the viral infection precedes the bacterial. That is, as
the prevalence of carriage increases, a greater fraction of people
infected with the influenza virus would already be colonized with
pneumococcus.
As complex as our model might seem, it captures only some of
the real complexity of the epidemiology of influenza, bacterial
pneumonia and the prevention and treatment of these diseases in
human populations. Contrary to what we assumed in our model:
(i) Human populations are not homogeneous and have multiple
subpopulations. The rates of transmission, prevalence of
pneumococcal carriage and the parameters governing course of
the infection and co-infection are not going to be the same for all
subpopulations. Age, life-style, social contact pattern, local
density and physical condition will all contribute to the values
of these parameters. Also contributing to this variation is immune
state of these hosts due to prior encounters with influenza viruses
and pneumococci that are antigenically the same or cross
reacting with those encountered during the pandemic. (ii)
Pneumococci are not homogenous. There is great deal of genetic
variation in S. pneumoniae including variation in the capsule
structure, their serotype, of which there are 93 at last count [51].
This underlying variation will certainly contribute to individual
differences in the infection and carriage parameters as will the
extent of coverage by polyvalent, but much less than 93- valent
vaccines.
While we can incorporate these other complexities into our
model, at this stage we don’t see much justification in doing so.
There are two reasons for this, one practical and one
philosophical. Estimates of the parameters of this extended model
are not available. Although we could generate numerical solutions
to the large numbers of equations in a more complex and realistic
model, without the constraints of parameter values in a realistic
range it would be difficult to interpret the implications of the
results of this analysis. This interpretation problem would be
further confounded by the vast numbers interactions between
different elements of this model.
The philosophical justification for not expanding the complexity
of these models is their role in this endeavor. In an essay about
model building in population biology written more than a half
century ago [52], Richard Levins argued that there are three
properties of a mathematical model we want to maximize, reality,
generality and precision. He postulated that we are only able to
maximize two at a time. To address this general question about
the morbidity and mortality of a pandemic with a 1918-like
influenza virus in contemporary populations, reality and generality
are more important than precision. Moreover, because of the
relative dearth of estimates of parameters and the problems of
interpreting complex models, reality and generality are the best we
can achieve at this time.
While our model is general for any combination of directly
transmitted viruses and bacteria, we restricted our numerical
analysis of its properties to only a single species of bacteria, S.
pneumoniae. These are not the sole bacteria known to be responsible
for bacterial pneumonia during the 1918 influenza pandemic or
anticipated to be so in future pandemics. Part of our justification
for focusing on pneumococcus in this is by default. Estimates of the
necessary parameters are more available for the pneumococcus
than other bacteria responsible for pneumonia. Another justifica-
tion is the relative prevalence of the different species of bacteria
responsible for these pneumonias. A review of antemortem
cultures from normally sterile sites of pneumonia patients in the
1918 pandemic showed that respectively S. pneumoniae, hymolytic
Streptococci (Group A Streptococcus) and all other bacteria
comprised 71%, 28% and 1% of positive cultures [9].
In contemporary populations the pneumococcus remains the
predominant bacterium responsible for community-acquired
bacterial pneumonia [53]; group A Streptococci are rare as a
source of these pneumonias (0–1%), athough they were commonly
associated with measles and influenza outbreaks in the pre-
antibiotic era [54,55,56]. Postmortem culture studies suggest that
Staphylococcus aureus pneumonia became a significant source of
mortality following influenza in subsequent influenza pandemics
and in contemporary seasonal influenza [57,58,59]. We suggest
that to some extent this observation is the product of sampling bias
in the era of antibiotic use. Because S. aureus pneumonias are more
likely to be fatal than those due to pneumococci and because of
concern about the incidence of antibiotic resistance in Staphylo-
cocci, these bacteria may be more likely to be cultured in
postmortems of antibiotic-treated patients. Most importantly, S.
aureus pneumonias are primarily nosocomial and less likely to be
responsible than pneumococci for the community-acquired
pneumonias that are the focus of our model. Be all this as it
may, as noted, our model is a general analogue of the
epidemiology of viral – bacterial co-infection. By changing the
parameter values, it can be applied to any combination of directly
transmitted viruses and bacteria.
In this report, we have presented the 1918 influenza as a worst
case. In theory, an influenza pandemic could be even more
devistating than that of 1918, espectically if antibiotic and vaccine
treatable and preventable secondary bacterial infections are not be
the major source of mortality. The H5N1 Avian influenza virus
has a much higher case mortality rate than the 1918 H1N1 and it
is not clear how much of this mortality can be attributed to
secondary infections with bacteria [7,60].
In conclusion, as a consequence of relatively lower prevalence of
pneumococcal carriage and intervention with vaccines and
antibiotics, the mortality of a pandemic with an 1918- like
influenza would be profoundly less in contemporary populations
than witnessed in 1918.
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